December 10, 1996
Preface to Document
by Murray Kahl
The question of whether Israeli concessions
is a positive step to further peace in the Middle East, or whether it only
exacerbates existing conditions that will eventually lead to a regional
war is answered by an important report of Congressman Jim Saxton (R-NJ),
Chairman, of the Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, U.S.
House of Representatives, entitled:
"APPROACHING THE NEW CYCLE OF ARAB-ISRAELI
FIGHTING."
The report is a detailed analysis leading
to the conclusion that Israel will most likely be the focus of an unified
effort by combined Islamic forces to destroy Israel.
The report highlights a majority opinion
in the Middle East that states, "'The question is no longer: Will the expected
and planned war between Israel and Syria ever break out? It is rather:
When will the war break out?'"
Militant Islam is seen as the motivating
factor threatening Israel's survival and to a lesser degree the United
States.
Other factors influencing Arab intransigence
are that the leaders of Iran, Syria, and Iraq, are determined to use the
doctrine of primogeniture as a methodology to ensure hereditary rights
transferral to family.
U.S. interests are at risk in Saudi Arabia
as power is transferred to the Abdallah faction. Prince Abdallah is perceived
as an ally of Syrian influence that is considered vital to Prince Abdallah's
rise to power.
Prince Abdallah is determined to seize
power through the ejection of the U.S. from the area as a solution to Saudi
Arabia's cash flow dilemma and by establishing more lucrative relations
with East Asia.
The report says that these "relations have
already initiated the bombing in Dahran." And that prince Abdallah promised
Syria to launch a massive oil embargo against the West in the evnt of a
major crisis with Israel.
Iran, Syria, and Iraq, are shown as plotting
a unified strategy in pursuit of regional objectives. This cooperation
was reached at the highest levels and establishes "arrangements" for the
"dispatch of Iranian expeditionary forces and weapons to the Syrian front."
Specific strategic goals are delineated
and military operations launched to simulate attacks on Israel. Both Iran
and Egypt are recorded as attempting to hone crack units with simulated
attacks. Iran with their Velayat operation and Egypt with their Badr-96
offensive. Both are clearly in preparation for a final offensive against
Israel.
Syria is portrayed as preparing for a major
war in which Syria is a victim. Syria expects a pre-emptive attack from
Israel in response to Syrian provocations, either directly or through its
epigone Lebanon who will join any military adventurism.
Planned Syrian provocations are discussed
in detail as their intent is to force an Israeli retaliation against terrorists
in South Lebanon, resulting in planned Syrian deaths that would create
the excuse for Syrian retaliation.
Both Iran and Syria stress the cooperation
between the two countries and Iran's support for any Syrian militarism
against Israel.
A detailed list of Iranian arms delivered
to Damascus are given. The weapons are sophisticated and lethal. Many are
delivered not only to HizbAllah but to PLO units stationed in refugees
camps in South West Lebanon.
The Palestinians are part of the calculus
and their forces are committed to assist in the event of any crisis in
the North. It is the Palestinian Authority and not the PLO making the commitment,
which assures the use of Palestinian "police" forces along with other terrorist
groups. Also involved are PLO intelligence and Syria intelligence joining
forces and creating a liaison section composed of senior Syrian and Palestinian
officers with headquarters in Beirut, Damascus, and Gaza.
Mention is made of the PLO preparations
for war as they continue to accelerate their construction of concrete bunkers
to be used for command centers, ammunition, and weapons storage. All part
of the coordinated plan.
Other portions of the plan include a nuclear
option using existing nuclear weapons possessed by Iran and Pakistan. The
nuclear philosophy is simple; if used, the Muslims can absorb a nuclear
strike while Israel cannot. This, in effect, neutralizes Israel's nuclear
capability and with a broad brush stroke also neutralizes the United States
as a participant due to anticipated U.S. reluctance to commit troops to
an area that may be subjected to biological and/or nuclear weapons. The
scenarios to use these weapons are well developed.
As explained, Syria's plans are to force
a response from Israel that will allow Syria to attack in force. The report
details one scenario in which Syria will launch a barrage of surface to
surface missiles (SSMs) against Israel and Israeli key military facilities.
Then a joint attack will be initiated with Palestinians in South Lebanon
along with the Palestinian Authority's 50,000 man "police" force, in conjunction
with "auxillary" forces, to launch a massive intifada and waves of terrorism.
Syria expects to reach its objectives on
the Golan, and Israel is expected to succumb to anticipated world pressure
to accept new Syrian positions. This scenario is of course possible if
Muslim assessments of Israeli strengths and weaknesses are accurate. The
report is clear in its understanding that Muslim leaders feel Israel's
military strength is declining, "collapsing from within," and presents
them with the opportunity to "resolve the Zionist menace once and for good."
The conclusion is that while there is no hard evidence as to date of armed
conflict, the Muslim elite await the "spark" that will "'compel' them into
taking action."
Introduction to Document
by Murray Kahl
Israeli & Global News reviewed and
presents the report as distributed to the highest levels on Capitol Hill.
Although written in early December 1996, it is still very relevant.
Congressman Jim Saxton (R-NJ) points out
that the issues advanced by the TFR (Task Force Report) are especially
important in view of the Clinton Administration's Middle East policy. Congressman
Saxton said, "The Administration continues to apply pressure on Jerusalem
to make additional concessions to Mr. Arafat while ignoring the concurrent
developments in the Middle East. Instead of pressuring the democratically
elected government of Israel to deviate from the policies it was elected
for, the US should concentrate on helping Israel meet the growing threat
of war."
Indeed, additional intelligence information
acquired since the report was originally issued only confirm and reinforce
the findings and conclusions.
In late December, once the weather suddenly
improved in Israel, Syria was apprehensive about an imminent outbreak of
hostilities with Israel. Most senior leaders in Damascus formally approached
their counterparts in Tehran and notified them about the possibility of
a war breaking out soon. An alarmed Tehran approached the uppermost circles
of power in Riyadh through both official and emergency channels. The Iranians
told the Saudis of the Syrian fears and informed them that Tehran would
provide Syria with all possible help. Tehran wanted to forewarn Riyadh
and calm in advance any fears that the Saudi Royal family might have. Tehran
stressed that the anticipated massive troop and air power movements, as
well as other forms of high wartime military readiness, would not be directed
against the Arabian Peninsula and would be exclusively designed to assist
Syria in its war with Israel.
The Israeli defense establishment is fully
aware of the gravity of the situation. In late December, Deputy Chief of
Staff, Matan Vilnai, announced that the IDF's working plan for 1997 includes
the possibility of a war with Syria. The IDF requested an additional emergency
budget for such issues as purchase of ammunition and accelerated training
of combat units.
Another alarming factor in the strategic
dynamics in the Middle East is the growing cooperation between Syria and
Egypt. Since the assessment of the military intentions of states is derived
from the evolution of their political posture, the recent development in
Cairo's positions concerning peace with Israel means that Egypt must now
be considered a potential threat. The extent of the political dimensions
of the Egyptian-Syrian cooperation that prompts such an assessment was
made clear by the Egyptian Ambassador to Israel, Muhammad Basyuni. Hence,
perhaps the most worrisome development since the completion of the TFR
is the emergence, in early January 1997, of an Egyptian strategy specifically
designed to escalate any perceived problems from a region-wide crisis into
a major war. President Mubarak is determined to ensure and strengthen Egypt's
undisputed role as the leader of the Arab World.
Initially, Mubarak sought international
recognition for Egypt's posture by insisting on Cairo as a full partner
in any "bilateral" negotiations between Israel and any Arab party. Washington
and Jerusalem accepted this position. Presently, confronted with the rise
of militant Islamism at home and the Islamicization process throughout
the Arab World, Mubarak shifted the all-Arab policy into generating crises
and building the justification for the total collapse of the "Peace Process."
Indeed, a senior Egyptian official told Jordan's al-Dustur that upon studying
Jerusalem's negotiating positions, Cairo concluded that Israel "already
started the war."
Last week, Egypt formally warned Israel.
In an interview with the Israeli magazine HaShavua, Egyptian Ambassador
to Israel, Muhammad Basyuni, threatened that if Israel does not reach an
agreement with Syria the entire region will explode. Basyuni said, "I'm
sure that everybody wants peace and needs peace, for if they [Israelis]
do not sign on [a recommitment to the Israeli/Arab accords] for peace,
then, and I don't threaten — but it will be bad."
Basyuni stressed that Cairo does not care
about the changes of Israeli governments nor their policies, and insisted
on Israeli adherence to the policies of the previous Labor government.
Significantly, he repeatedly conditioned a continuance of the Israeli-Egyptian
peace agreement on Jerusalem accepting the Syrian and Arafat negotiating
positions. Basyuni said, "The [peace] agreement between Israel and Egypt
will break if Israel does not sign [an agreement] with Syria." He stressed
that the Egyptian-Israeli peace is valid only within the context of Egypt's
leadership of the Arab world. He said, "The [peace] agreement signed with
Egypt is conditioned on an overall peace agreement with all Arab countries.
The agreement with us will break if Israel does not sign [agreements] with
Syria and the other Arab states." Basyuni said, " I want it to be clear
that when Egypt signed the peace agreement with Israel, the agreement is
conditioned on a comprehensive agreement with all Arab states." Basyuni
explained, "We believe that a partial peace agreement with one Arab country
or another is a fragile and unstable agreement. True, you [Israel] signed
[peace agreements] with Egypt and Jordan, but this will not be sufficient
until a peace agreement is signed with all Arab states, and this includes
Syria." Basyuni stressed that "even Jordan, like Egypt, is an integral
part of the Arab states [World], and it will never agree to remain the
sole ally of Israel."
Synopsis
APPROACHING THE NEW CYCLE OF ARAB-ISRAELI
FIGHTING
Approaching the end of 1996, the Middle
East may well be on the verge of a major regional war. The supreme leaders
in most Arab states, as well as in Iran and Pakistan are convinced that
the present vulnerability of Israel is so great that there is a unique
opportunity to begin the process leading to the destruction of Israel.
These circumstances are considered to be a historic window of opportunity
the Muslim World should not miss. Therefore, these Muslim leaders have
finalized numerous strategies and tactical alliances heretofore non-existent
in the region. Several Arab states, as well as Iran and Pakistan, have
been engaged in a frantic military build-up and active preparations in
the last few months.
When analyzing these unfolding developments,
it is highly significant to recall the emerging mega-trends in the Middle
East: The rise of militant Islam as the primary motivating factor of the
Arab public has already reached unprecedented levels. The present leaders
of Iran, Syria and Iraq are determined to transfer power to their sons-and-heirs.
The succession struggle in Saudi Arabia is peaking. These mega-trends are
pushing toward a crisis environment. A dramatic breakout from the deadlock
is virtually inevitable. The latest developments in the military threat
to Israel fit perfectly into this overall trend.
THE LATEST STRATEGIC MILITARY MOVES
AT THE THEATER-LEVEL:
Specific military moves at the national-strategic
level suggesting active preparations for a possible war in the near future
began in the spring of 1996. These activities range from highly irregular
and highly significant military exercises to political and international
agreements.
SPECIFIC TACTICAL PREPARATIONS:
Starting mid August, the Syrian Armed Forces
have conducted a series of redeployments and maneuvers that have direct
implications for their ability to launch an attack on Israel. The concurrent
activities of both the Iraqi Armed Forces and PLO forces in Lebanon also
contribute to the enhancement of the Arab military capabilities against
Israel. Meanwhile, Iran has delivered, via Syria, a whole range of vastly
improved weapons to the HizbAllah and other terrorist forces based on the
border with Israel. Tens of flights delivered military equipment and highly
specialized systems for Syrian and HizbAllah units.
THE NUCLEAR FACTOR:
The nuclear factor has become a crucial
element in any conflict in the Middle East. Iran has nuclear weapons and
so does Pakistan. The supreme leaders in Tehran are convinced that the
numerous warheads purchased from the former Soviet Central Asia are operational.
Irrespective of skeptic "expert opinion" in the West, the decision-makers
in Tehran operate on the basis of their own conviction that Iran has operational
nuclear weapons. Moreover, there are indications of a Pakistani agreement,
with Chinese consent, to "contribute" to the Muslim nuclear deterrence.
And there is no doubt that Pakistan has operational nuclear weapons.
The Arabs have a well defined nuclear doctrine
they believe in effect neutralizes Israel's "deterrence factor" at the
very least for the strategically crucial initial period of war -- the time
frame in which the Arab-Iranian forces manage their strategic grab, while
the Israeli government agonizes over the decision how to react to the nuclear
ultimatum and the sudden war. Moreover, the Arabs and the Iranians are
convinced they can also deter an American cover for Israel.
THE WAR SCENARIO:
The Syrians and their allies have well
defined contingency plans. The basic Syrian approach to a major war is
based on the contingency plans prepared and exercised for the war that
almost erupted in the Fall of 1992, while the plans for a strategic grab
in a limited war are based on contingency plans prepared in 1994 and exercised
since then. The latest changes in Syrian military deployment fit the prerequisites
of these contingency plans.
ASSESSMENT:
When dealing with the Middle East, one
should leave the "Crystal Ball" under lock and key. However, it is possible
to point out to emerging and dominant trends in the crisis management.
Arab leaders are convinced that a major brinkmanship crisis, the return
to a no-war-no-peace tense situation, even the resumption of limited clashes,
are a must to their own survival. Their undertaking of these steps means
that they are fully ready to meet the possibility of a major war.
One reason for the readiness to face war,
as opposed to the reluctance shown previously, is the Muslim World's conviction
that Israel is falling apart. Considering the building Islamist pressure
to destroy Israel under any conditions, the Arab and Iranian leaders who
are determined to hold on to power may find these circumstances too tempting
to be passed over.
Meanwhile, on a more pragmatic and realistic
level, the fear of Israel's military might has shrunk and this factor is
high on the leaders' mind. This newly found Arab sense of self-confidence
and the firm belief in the ability to succeed in the initial phase of a
war creates a new and worrisome framework within which these leaders examine
the choices ahead of them.
Further more, at the higher political levels
of the entire Arab World and most significantly in capitals considered
relatively supportive of the "peace process," there is more hostile and
confrontational attitude toward Israel -- declaring a state of "cold war"
between Israel and its Arab partners, and calls for the pursuit of policies
of "armed peace" and even "confrontational peace" toward Israel.
Taken together, the multitude of political,
strategic and tactical moves leave no doubt that the key leaders in the
Arab World and Iran have already determined to continue the escalatory
brinkmanship even as the likelihood of war is growing. They are now preoccupied
mainly with strategic and military decisions -- that is, determining the
optimal conditions for initiating the war, achieving surprise despite the
protracted escalatory crisis and Israel's edginess, etc.
However, there is no hard evidence, yet,
of a specific decision to start something on a fixed date. Presently, the
prevailing mood among the political, military and security elites in the
Arab World is that of an almost passive, though willing, acceptance of
fate's course. As the region continues to deteriorate towards an eruption
of violence, they are waiting for the inevitable spark to emerge and "compel"
them into taking action. Among the supreme leaders that really count, the
"straw" seems to be still missing. But for how long?
TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM &
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
APPROACHING THE NEW CYCLE OF ARAB-ISRAELI
FIGHTING
December 10, 1996
Approaching the end of 1996, the Middle
East may well be on the verge of a major regional war. Numerous sources
in the region report that the supreme leaders -- both civilians and military
-- in most Arab states, as well as in Iran and Pakistan are convinced that
the present vulnerability of Israel is so great that there is a unique
opportunity to, at the very least, begin the process leading to the destruction
of Israel. These circumstances are considered to be a historic window of
opportunity the Muslim World should not miss. Therefore, these Muslim leaders
have finalized numerous strategies and tactical alliances heretofore non-existent
in the region.
Toward this end, several Arab states, as
well as Iran and Pakistan, have been engaged in a frantic military build-up
and active preparations in the last few months. Indeed, this crisis is
escalating even as all key players continue to reassert their commitment
to the US-inspired "Peace Process". However, the slide to war is the real
and dominant dynamics in the Near East because it represents the reaction
of the Muslim World to the challenges of modernization -- petrification
exacerbated and aggravated by the post-Gulf Crisis regional dynamics, and
particularly the intrusion policy of the Clinton Administration toward
the Hub of Islam.
In late November 1996, Na'il Mukhaybar,
one of the most authoritative Arab commentators on Middle East affairs
observed: "The question is no longer: Will the expected and planned war
between Israel and Syria ever break out? It is rather: When will the war
break out?" This is not a minority opinion. It is also shared by senior
officials in the Arab Middle East.
For example, in late October, a senior
Jordanian diplomat warned that "Syria is preparing for a surprise military
attack on Israel in the coming weeks." This assessment was based on high-level
contacts between Damascus and Amman, especially between senior officers
of both armies, in which the military situation in the region was discussed.
In these meetings the Syrians asked for passive and indirect support from
the Jordanian military -- for Jordan to hold maneuvers near Israeli border
in order to compel IDF to divert forces and hold them there.
Many other Arab and Iranian officials share
the same view. There is a commonly shared firm belief among the senior
experts serving Middle Eastern governments that the political-strategic
dynamics in the Middle East have already reached a deadlock that makes
a dramatic breakout inevitable. The strong commitment to such a dramatic
breakout among most senior leaders is the key to understanding the present
dangers. These leaders see no alternative to a dramatic breakout possible
only through cataclysmic violence. The mere revival of the ongoing processes
-- be it the peace process on the Arabs' terms or even the return to a
region-wide state of war -- will no longer suffice to meet the strategic
challenges from Islamic revivalism. Hence, the slide toward the resumption
of violence -- ranging from spectacular terrorism to an all-out war --
between the Arabs and Israel. This is a very prudent and reasonable assessment
given the overall regional dynamics over the last few months, particularly
if examined in the context of the strategic regional dynamics of the last
couple of years. Essentially, in their entirety, the tactical and military
developments of recent months reinforce and confirm the earlier strategic
posturing. Therefore, these military activities can, and should, be perceived
as implementation of earlier grand designs. And this complementary relationship
between the strategic and tactical dynamics is the key to the alarmist
approach to interpreting the unfolding events.
When analyzing these unfolding developments,
it is highly significant to recall the emerging mega-trends in the region:
-
The rise of militant Islam as the primary
motivating factor of the Arab public has already reached unprecedented
levels. The popular mistrust in existing nation-states, the hostility toward
the US/West over intervention and presence in the Muslim World (in Iraq,
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, etc.), and the pressure on those in power to pursue
"Islamic policies" continue to markedly increase. It will be difficult
for rulers to resist the growing popular outcry and stay out of a major
crisis with Israel, let alone support the US under such circumstances.
-
The present leaders of Iran, Syria and Iraq
are determined to transfer power to their sons-and-heirs. They are convinced
that only the emergence of a close alliance leading to a perpetual crisis
against the rest of the world will rally the potential contenders in their
own respective coteries to accept their chosen sons as leaders. The mere
existence of a functioning militant block will enable the other "sons-of"
to assist and save a "son-of" in distress. Given its popular Islamist connotations
-- liberating al-Quds - the current policy of brinkmanship and crisis is
the best possible starting point for the establishment of this block.
-
The succession struggle in Saudi Arabia is
peaking. The Abdallah faction is determined to seize power through the
eviction of the US from the region, the solution of Saudi Arabia's shortage
of cash by accepting more lucrative contracts with East Asia at the expense
of the West, and by establishing close relations with the radical states
as a guarantee against Islamist subversion. The very close Abdallah-Assad
relations constitute the key to Prince Abdallah's rise to power. These
relations have already initiated the bombing in Dahran. Prince Abdallah
has already promised Damascus to deliver a comprehensive oil embargo against
the West in case of a major crisis with Israel.
Thus, the mega-trends in the Middle East are
pushing toward a crisis environment. A dramatic breakout from the deadlock
is virtually inevitable. The latest developments in the military threat
to Israel fit perfectly into this overall trend.
THE LATEST STRATEGIC MILITARY MOVES AT THE
THEATER-LEVEL
Specific military moves at the national-strategic
level suggesting active preparations for a possible war in the near future
began in the spring of 1996. These activities range from highly irregular
and highly significant military exercises to political and international
agreements.
-
In the Spring of 1996, Hafiz al-Assad and
Saddam Hussein met secretly for a summit to ensure joint pursuit of regional
objectives. The meeting took place in the area where the borders of Turkey,
Iraq and Syria meet. This summit was aimed to get the endorsement and approval
of both top leaders to the completion of strategic agreements reached in
the course of recent high-level bilateral and tripartite high-level negotiations
(Tehran is the third party). This summit created the conditions for the
revival of the Eastern Front and set the specific and workable arrangements
for the dispatch of Iranian expeditionary forces and weapons to the Syrian
front.
-
In late May 1996, Tehran demonstrated how
seriously Iran takes the possibility of dispatching forces to the Israeli
front. Iran conducted its largest military exercise ever -- Velayat. The
essence of Velayat was a multiple corps deep offensive in the aftermath
of a long range advance identical to the distance between Iran and Israel.
The objective of Velayat was to confirm Iran's ability to send a strategically
effective expeditionary force -- the Velayat Force -- to contribute to
a regional war against high-quality armies. The primary intended objective
of the exercise is Israel. The entire Iranian top leadership and high command
were present at the exercise. Subsequent Iranian analysis pointed out deficiencies
in the planning of the operations of a key special forces unit. These were
quickly corrected and these improvements were demonstrated to the Tehran
leadership in a follow-up exercise in late October.
-
With Iran's ability to significantly contribute
to the military effort against Israel proven, Damascus and Tehran conducted
high-level discussions aimed at the formulation of a joint war strategy.
In mid June, Iran and Syria signed a major agreement specifically for the
codification of their military cooperation against Israel. This agreement
also provides for joint exercises in northern and northeastern Iran of
the command elements of Syrian units and the Iranian units that will arrive
to support them on the Golan front. By mid August, Iraq was brought into
this framework with the establishment of a tripartite "joint command" specifically
aimed to expedite the preparations for, and conduct of, "a major war against
Israel". A key component of this joint command has been the coordination
of the activities of Iran, Iraq, and Syria in mobilizing their SSM forces
for a possible missile barrage against Israel.
-
In late September, the Palestinian factor
was added to the joint preparations when the Palestinian Authorities (PA)
entered into a major military agreement with Syria. Significantly, this
agreement is between the PA, and not the PLO, and Syria, thus explicitly
committing the Palestinian forces in the territories. The essence of the
agreement is for the Palestinian "police" forces and other armed elements
(terrorist organizations) to flare-up the Israeli interior in case of an
escalation in the north. Syrian and PLO intelligence established a liaison
section made up of senior Syrian and Palestinian intelligence officers
with HQs in Beirut, Damascus and Gaza. In return, Syria will provide weapons
and advanced training to PLO units in the refugees camps in southern Lebanon
- - units disarmed as part of the Israeli-Lebanese agreements. Meanwhile,
the PLO's preparations for an imminent war are evident. In Gaza, Arafat
ordered the marked acceleration of the building of a personal command bunker,
four stories deep. Moreover, the PLO is rapidly building all over Gaza
a chain of command centers, ammunition and weapons-storage areas -- all
of them underground and well fortified to even withstand Israeli bombing
and shelling. The PA's security services are also accumulating large stockpiles
of anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, including missiles, even though
they are forbidden by the Oslo Accords.
-
In mid September, the Egyptian Armed Forces
conducted their largest military exercise since the late 1970s. The 10-days
Badr-96 exercise simulated a strategic deep offensive against Israel and
included a large scale call-up of reserves, a major amphibious landing
on the Sinai coast, a nightly assault crossing of the Suez Canal, and major
breakthroughs of defensive dispositions manned by high quality forces.
In mid October, senior officers of the Egyptian Army conducted a tour of
the Sinai, including areas near the Israeli border, in violation of the
provisions of the peace agreement with Israel. It was a commanders' tour
aimed to acquaint them with the peculiarities of a theater they might have
to operate in. Meanwhile, Cairo encourages the resumption of calls for
war at the political level. Brig.Gen. (Ret.) Mohammed Muawad Gad al-Moula,
was permitted to establish a new political party committed "to revive the
'victorious spirit' of the October 1973 War" and whose leadership is made
of retired senior officers. "We have no choice but to adopt a platform
for rebuilding a strong Egypt and preparing a new generation capable of
fighting any attackers," al-Moula told the semi-official al-Ahram. "We
have to prepare for a fresh confrontation with Israel."
-
Starting early October, there have been several
cycles of bilateral and multilateral political-military discussions and
coordination sessions between Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Jordan. According
to high-level Iranian sources, the initial phase of these consultations
led to the adoption of "pan-Arab cooperation" making it possible "to impose
a military blockade on Israel from the north, east, and south." In late
October, senior officers from Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon held a series
of meetings to coordinate and agree on a number of specific military measures
and strategies for the forthcoming confrontation with Israel.
-
In early November, second-tier states were
being brought into "the circle of confrontation" -- the group of states
of committed to contributing to the Arab-Iranian war effort. Most significant
was the Syrian-Pakistani military agreement signed in Islamabad by the
Defense Ministers of Syria and Pakistan which arranged for the seconding
of Pakistani military experts and senior officers, pilots and technicians,
and key equipment to Syria.
-
In late November, Damascus shared a comprehensive
intelligence assessment with its Arab allies and a host of terrorist organizations.
The primary objective was to warn of an impending major war between Israel
and Syria with the active participation of, and support from, US forces
on the side of Israel. Damascus has already concluded that "Israel is now
preparing for a comprehensive war with Syria." The Syrian briefing points
out to the call-up of reserves in Israel as indicative of an impending
war. Special attention is paid to the military training in the Negev with
US Marines. Syrian intelligence claims that "the training, objectives,
and plans of these maneuvers focus on the occupied Syrian Golan and a number
of positions west of Damascus." The Syrian sources are convinced that "one
of these positions is a Syrian manufacturing plant for chemical weapons."
Concerning the political-strategic situation
in Damascus, the Syrian briefing is consistent in its emphasis on the immediacy
of war, but seemingly self-contradictory on the sources of this war. On
the one hand, the Syrian briefing states that "the Syrian leadership now
believes that the military option to liberate the Golan from the Israeli
Army is a legitimate Syrian option. It also believes that Syria has the
right to resort to this option any time it deems appropriate." This assertion
virtually confirms the Syrian intention to initiate hostilities in order
to break the deadlock in the region.
However, the section dealing with the military
assessment of Syrian Intelligence emphasizes the possibility of an Israeli
attack on Syria. Damascus now believes that "the Israeli Army will launch
an imminent large-scale military operation against the Syrian Forces stationed
adjacent to the Golan, in addition to the Syrian Forces that were relocated
in Lebanon near the eastern Syrian border with Lebanon that extends to
the Golan Heights." Presumably, this will be an Israeli preemptive strike
given the extent of the Syrian preparations.
The Syrian briefing leaves no doubt that
even under these circumstances, Damascus will pursue its own assertive
war aims, not just repel the Israeli aggression. The Syrian briefing states
that "the Syrian President instructed the command of the Syrian Forces
stationed near the Golan to immediately retaliate against any attack by
the Israeli Army." Moreover, Assad ordered his forces to immediately launch
a deep strategic strike and, toward this end, "the Syrian Army placed its
SCUD missile systems at maximum alert should war break out with Israel."
These SSMs, Damascus argues, "can hit any target inside Israel."
-
The extent of the Iranian commitment to actively
supporting the Syrian war effort is of crucial importance for the highest
levels of leadership in Damascus. Indeed, in late November, Syrian sources
stressed that Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani had just reassured President
Assad in a written message that "should war break out with Israel, Iran
will support Syria with the necessary military hardware in order to strengthen
the Syrian military position."
Tehran takes this commitment very seriously,
and, in the first week of December, dispatched Foreign Minister Ali Akbar
Velayati for urgent high-level consultations. Velayati arrived in Damascus
carrying yet another extremely important message from Hashemi-Rafsanjani
for Assad. He then conducted extensive discussions with Assad and other
senior officials on regional issues. According to the Iranian media, "the
latest regional and international developments as well as further promotion
of Tehran-Damascus ties were discussed in the meetings."
Velayati's discussions with Assad and his
immediate aides went far beyond that, addressing Syrian-Iranian cooperation
in the imminent and possibly inevitable war. Iranian sources highlighted
the discussions with Assad in which Velayati "referred to foreign pressures
and the Zionist plots and underlined the need to strengthen cooperation
between Iran and Syria. The Syrian President stressed this cooperation
will help establishment of peace and tranquility in the whole region."
Both Damascus and Tehran agree that there is going to be a lot of violence
-- ranging from terrorism to war -- on the road to regional peace.
Iranian sources report that "the Syrian
President stressed the need to support the Islamic resistance in south
Lebanon to confront the Zionist aggressions and to defend the Lebanese
territory." Velayati and Assad also expressed support and commitment to
ensuring Iraq's territorial integrity -- a precondition for Saddam Hussein's
support. Velayati also reiterated the Iranian long-standing support for
"the aspiration of the Palestinian nation and the Islamic resistance in
their struggle against the Zionist regime." He called for "a united action
by the Islamic states to foil conspiracies of enemies." Velayati assured
Assad that "the Tehran-Damascus close cooperation will lead to establishment
of regional peace and tranquility." Velayati returned to Tehran carrying
a most important message from Assad to Hashemi-Rafsanjani.
*
SPECIFIC TACTICAL PREPARATIONS
Starting mid August, the Syrian Armed Forces
have conducted a series of redeployments and maneuvers that have direct
implications for their ability to launch an attack on Israel. The concurrent
activities of both the Iraqi Armed Forces and PLO forces in Lebanon also
contribute to the enhancement of the Arab military capabilities against
Israel.
-
The initial Syrian force movements in Lebanon
and near the Golan, especially near Mt. Hermon, already changed the strategic
posture in the region. The changes in the deployment of Syrian forces and
units in Lebanon were accomplished in two stages.
In the first phase, in late August, mechanized
units deployed from Bhamdun and Dahr al-Baydar in central Lebanon to forward
positions very close to the Israeli-held security zone. These Syrian forces
deployed in such a way that any Israeli retaliation against terrorists
in south Lebanon will inevitably kill Syrian soldiers, thus creating the
"excuse" for further escalation. In addition, two of the three regiments
of 14th Special Forces/Commando Division deployed from the Biqaa to forward
positions on the Syrian Hermon overlooking the Israeli key early warning
station on Mt.Hermon from the north and east.
In the second phase, completed in mid September,
units of the 10th Mechanized Division deployed from the Beirut area along
the Beirut-Damascus Highway all the way to the Biqaa, replacing the units
that had deployed to the south. The third regiment of the 14th Special
Forces/Commando Division deployed from Beirut to forward positions in south-eastern
Lebanon, overlooking the Israeli Mt.Hermon from the west.
The deployment of the 14th Special Forces/Commando
Division enables it to strike Israel's key early warning station on a moment
notice, thus harming, if not paralyzing Israel's ability to detect a major
surprise attack.
Units of the Syrian internal police replaced
the Syrian troops in Beirut. Moreover, Syrian Air Defense units -- both
mobile SAM batteries and AAA -- deployed to forward positions on the Beirut-Damascus
Highway very close to the Lebanese border, but still on Syrian territory.
In late September, the Syrian forces were
in a position to instigate a provocation of strategic dimensions. Syrian
forces deployed behind a thin layer of Lebanese Army units around the SLA-held
Jezzine salient. Additional Lebanese Army forces, totaling three brigades,
deployed along the Israeli- and SLA-held security zone in front of the
Syrian forces. The Syrian operational plan calls for an assault, by the
Lebanese Army with "support" from the Syrian Army, on Jezzine, and, should
the need arise, also on sectors of the security zone. According to Lebanese
sources, the Syrian High Command is convinced that Jezzine will fall within
12 hours, and a few segments in the security zone within 24 hours. Damascus
knows that Israel will have to retaliate with massive ground forces, thus
providing the "justification" for the Syrian launching of a major escalation
and war.
-
All through the summer and fall of 1996, the
Syrian Armed Forces conducted a series of offensive exercises and related
troop movements. As a result of these activities, numerous Syrian units
ended up much closer to the Golan Heights that their permanent deployment
areas. Moreover, these units are now deployed in a high state of readiness
and can move on the offensive with a very short forewarning.
Of unique importance within these military
activities were the exercises involving SCUD SAMs. At the end of the summer
exercises, a Syrian unit launched a SCUD-C under conditions of an offensive
war. Since then, and particularly in the second half of October, Damascus
began conducting "irregular movements" with its SCUD units. According to
Lebanese and Syrian sources, these constant maneuvers are aimed to further
complicate Israel's ability to neutralize the Syrian deep strike capabilities
through a preemptive strike.
In late October, Syrian officials briefed
their Lebanese counterparts that the Syrian Armed Forces were properly
deployed and ready for a preemptive strike against Israel. "The Syrians
are capable of preceding/preempting Netanyahu's strike by initiating the
attack," reported Lebanese sources.
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As of mid October, Iraqi military units, including
armor, artillery and missile units, began moving from central Iraq toward
the Syrian border. Iraq also began a call up of reservists and the activation
of units in western Iraq that had been dormant since the Gulf War. The
majority of the main roads leading toward the Syrian border were taken
over by the Iraqi military and closed for civilian traffic. Jordanian sources
stressed that these are movements of Iraqi reinforcements to near the Syrian
border in anticipation for the eruption of hostilities.
-
By mid to late October, the Syrian large-scale
maneuvers and related troop movements got too close to the Golan Heights
to be ignored as "routine". Taken in the context of the latest Syrian "exercises"
with SSMs and major armored forces, these activities amount to "crawling"
toward the forward positions enabling Syria to launch a surprise surge
into the Golan as well as escalation in southern Lebanon aimed to achieve
initial grabs.
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Meanwhile, throughout the fall of 1996, Iran
delivered, via Syria, a whole range of vastly improved weapons to the HizbAllah
and other terrorist forces based on the border with Israel. Among these
weapon systems are the truck-mounted Fajr-3 240mm rockets (which, with
a range of 26-27 miles, can hit major Israeli objectives from beyond the
security zone), the highly lethal FAGOT ATGMs (Soviet design), 35mm Oerlikon
automatic guns (a Swiss weapon good against both helicopters and surface
objectives). The Iranians also delivered large quantities of weapons already
in the HizbAllah arsenals including Grad-M 122mm rockets, Isphahan rockets,
Stingers SFSAMs, SAGGER ATGMs, night vision equipment, explosives and ammunition.
The Iranians and the Syrians also oversaw the flow of weapons to the PLO
units in the refugee camps of southwest Lebanon, implementing Syria's part
in the PLO-Syria agreement. The Iranian airlift of weapons and equipment
for the HizbAllah and terrorist organizations intensified markedly in the
first week of December. Tens of flights of both military and civilian transports
delivered military equipment and highly specialized systems for terrorists
to the Damascus airport, from where the goods were delivered to Syrian
and HizbAllah units.
*
THE NUCLEAR FACTOR
The nuclear factor has become a crucial element
in any conflict in the Middle East. Iran has nuclear weapons, and so does
Pakistan. The supreme leaders in Tehran are convinced that the numerous
warheads purchased from the former Soviet Central Asia are operational.
Irrespective of skeptic "expert opinion" in the West, they -- the decision-makers
in Tehran -- operate on the basis of their own conviction that Iran has
operational nuclear weapons. Moreover, there are indications of a Pakistani
agreement, with Chinese consent, to "contribute" to the Muslim nuclear
deterrence. And there is no doubt that Pakistan has operational nuclear
weapons.
The Arabs have a well defined nuclear doctrine.
Already in the late 1970s, the Syrians introduced the doctrinal tenet that
since Israel cannot withstand even a few nuclear strikes while the Muslim
World can prevail a massive nuclear attack of the magnitude attributed
to Israel's capabilities, the nuclear factor is essentially irrelevant
for as long as Arab leaders can hold their position in a strategic nuclear
brinkmanship. While Tehran and Damascus are willing to gamble on such a
brinkmanship, Jerusalem cannot afford to be wrong -- Israel will not survive
as a viable country in the aftermath of a strike with the few tactical
nuclear warheads Iran has. Therefore, the mere existence of a credible
nuclear threat (on top of the known arsenals of chemical and biological
weapons) in effect neutralizes Israel's "deterrence factor" at the very
least for the strategically crucial initial period of war -- the time frame
in which the Arab-Iranian forces manage their strategic grab, while the
Israeli government agonizes over the decision how to react to the nuclear
ultimatum and the sudden war. Moreover, Washington will be most reluctant
to commit American forces and assets under conditions of possible exposure
to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, particularly given the current
Gulf Syndrome crisis. Hence, the Arabs and the Iranians can also deter
an American cover for Israel.
The nuclear issue is not an theoretical
academic or speculative issue. In the last days of November, Tehran "determined"
that Israel already put its missiles on "atomic readiness". According to
Iranian sources, Tehran did so in part on the basis of intelligence data
(such satellite photographs and intercepts) acquired in Russia and Central
Asia. On the basis of this "data" Tehran undertook the "appropriate countermeasures".
And it is under this umbrella of nuclear uncertainty, that the Arab-Iranian
non-nuclear war will be waged.
*
THE WAR SCENARIO
The Syrians and their allies have well defined
contingency plans. The basic Syrian approach to a major war is based on
the contingency plans prepared and exercised for the war that almost was
in the Fall of 1992, while the plans for a strategic grab in a limited
war are based on contingency plans prepared in 1994, and exercised since
then.
Israeli security sources describe the 1994
contingency plan for a quick territorial grab on the Golan in the context
of a limited war. The first step is the deployment of Commando forces to
advance positions near the Israeli border. Then, once Damascus determines
that hostilities are imminent, the Syrians will begin the moving around
of SSMs inside Syria to reduce vulnerability to Israeli preemption or retaliation.
The attack by the Commando forces on key objectives in the Israeli tactical
depth will be followed immediately by an offensive surge of tank heavy
forces. At the same time, other major Syrian units will be rushing toward
the Golan in order to deter Israel from escalation and a massive counter-attack.
Damascus intends to complete all these moves within 24-48 hours. Then,
with Syrian forces still holding a small part of the Golan and a few Israeli
POWs, Damascus and the Arab World will call for international pressure
on Israel to impose cease fire, and to demonstrate "flexibility" and "realism"
in negotiations with Syria.
Numerous Syrian, Iranian and Lebanese sources
provided data that enables the reconstruction of the Syrian contingency
plans for a major war. The first step will be a provocation launched from
Lebanon -- a "Lebanese" attack on the SLA and/or a major HizbAllah operation
against an Israeli strategic target and/or a spectacular terrorist strike
at the heart of Israel. As planned, such a provocation is bound to instigate
a major Israeli "response" in Lebanon. Since, because of the nature of
the Syrian deployment in south Lebanon, Syrian troops will be killed in
any such an Israeli retaliatory strike, Damascus will thus be in a position
to call the Israeli actions an unacceptable aggression and threat to Damascus.
The Syrians will then have the "justification"
to "retaliate" by launching a barrage of SSMs against Israeli cities and
key military facilities. Meanwhile, in solidarity with Palestinian victims
in south Lebanon, the PLO's 50,000 "police" and "auxiliaries" will launch
a massive "intifadah" and a wave of terrorism from their safe-havens in
the territories. Taken together, these activities will prove sufficient
to prevent a timely deployment of Israeli reserves to the Golan.
By then, however, the Syrian Armed Forces
will have already launched a surprise surge largely based on the 1994 contingency
plan. Given the Israeli inability to react, the Syrian forces will succeed
in securing limited grabs on the Golan. Then, Damascus and its allies are
convinced, international pressure -- especially, if there are also oil
embargo and Egyptian threat to intervene militarily -- will compel Israel
to reach a political compromise on their terms.
Meanwhile, in case of an Israeli refusal
to compromise, and hence a failure with the diplomatic initiative, the
Syrians will be in position to impose a major escalation with the arrival
of the main Syrian forces, as well as the sizeable Iraqi and Iranian expeditionary
forces. Now surging also through Jordan, these forces will vastly expand
and enlarge the Eastern front.
Given Badr-96, the mere war preparations
in Egypt, will, at the very least, compel the IDF to keep forces on the
southern border, just to be safe. Moreover, building pressure in the Arab/Muslim
World for all governments and peoples to join the Jihad or face popular
uprisings because of their "un-Islamic" posture will most likely entice
such governments as Egypt's and Jordan's to join the war rather than risk
overthrow. Meanwhile, led by Saudi Arabia, the Muslim World will declare
oil embargo. There are sufficient Islamist terrorists all over the West
to launch a wave of terrorism in Europe and the US in order to prevent
(or delay) US assistance to Israel.
With the militarily debilitating winter
weather coming very soon, this scenario is all the more tempting from a
strategic point of view. Given the adverse opening conditions and initial
period of war, as well as the sudden escalation of the Arab-Iranian offensive,
it is safe to assume that it will take the IDF more than a few days to
repel all the Arab-Iranian forces from Israeli territory. Damascus, Tehran,
Cairo and Baghdad believe that it is not inconceivable that a marked deterioration
in the weather will slow down the Israelis before their counter-attacks
could evict the Arab-Iranian forces from the Golan Heights. The Arabs and
Iranians are convinced that the consequent virtual pause in the mobile
war and severe limitations on the use of the Israeli Air Force will create
both an opportunity and an incentive for the international community to
pressure Israel into capitulation before the spring weather creates proper
conditions for the resumption of a major mobile war.
*
ASSESSMENT
When dealing with the Third World, and particularly
the Middle East, one should leave the Crystal Ball under lock and key.
Given the dominant power of the personality of individual leaders as the
source of decision-making -- based on these leaders' own reading of the
situation on the basis of the information they have and believe in -- and
given the penchant of these leaders for the "conspiracy" theories and susceptibility
to the "straw factor" (a small and at time relatively insignificant input
pushes the leader into a major decision he has been procrastinating on
-- the straw that breaks the camel's back), it is virtually impossible
to accurately predict what any of the dominant leaders involved in this
crisis will ultimately do. However, it is possible to point out to emerging
and dominant trends in the crisis management.
Starting the current crisis, the principal
leaders may not have wanted war. At the least, they were wavering about
it. Since the late 1980s, Arab leaders have been reluctant to embark on
major undertakings against Israel. However, these Arab leaders are also
convinced that a major brinkmanship crisis, the return to a no-war-no-peace
tense situation, and even the resumption of limited clashes, are a must
to their own survival. These leaders also know that any of these measures
can quickly escalate into a major war. Hence, their undertaking these steps
means that these Arab leaders are fully ready to meet the possibility of
a major war.
One reason for the readiness to face war,
as opposed to the reluctance shown previously, is the Muslim World's reading
of Israel. Indeed, most senior leaders (especially in Damascus, Tehran,
Baghdad and Cairo) are convinced that Israel is falling apart -- collapsing
from within in a unique state of self-confusion, of having lost the WILL
to fight and survive. Hence, the current crisis is unfolding in the context
of a historical window of opportunity to resolve the Zionist menace once
and for good. In this context, the extent of the populist power of Islam
-- as reflected in the return to Islamic traditions in all aspects of life
in the Hub of Islam, in the increasing Islamic profile of the supreme leaders
-- over national security decisions is a major yet unquantifyable factor.
There should be no doubt that the most important leaders are strongly influenced
by their Islamic heritage and their own legacy and historical contribution
to the Islamic "cause". Hence, the lure of the possibility to liberate
al-Quds and destroy Israel may be a far stronger an input to their decision
making process than what cold logic would have. Considering the building
Islamist pressure to destroy Israel under any conditions, the Arab and
Iranian leaders who are determined to hold to power may find these circumstances
too tempting to be passed over.
Meanwhile, on a more pragmatic and realistic
level, the fear of Israel's military might has shrunk. These leaders, particularly
in Damascus, Baghdad and Tehran, are fully aware of the escalatory potential
of their move -- the initiation of major brinkmanship and crisis. They
know that a crisis of the magnitude and potential strategic impact they
are instigating can easily escalate to a major regional war. But now, they
have the nuclear umbrella. Arab strategic studies, as well as the unprecedented
magnitude of development and acquisition of SSMs and all types of weapons
of mass destruction, show that this factor is high on the leaders' mind.
This newly found sense of self-confidence and the firm belief in the ability
to succeed in the initial phase of a war create a new, and worrisome, framework
within which these leaders examine the choices ahead of them.
Further more, at the higher political levels
of the entire Arab World, and most significantly in Cairo, Amman and other
capitals considered relatively supportive of the "peace process", there
is a distinct and marked change in the attitude towards Israel. The present
attitude is more hostile and confrontational, and the resort to force is
no longer ruled out as being anathema in the era of a "peace process".
This widespread acceptability of the possibility of war encourages these
leaders who are committed to conflict. The Egyptians now talk about a state
of "cold war" between Israel and its Arab partners to peace -- a fundamental
change from the previous term of "cold peace". Other political-military
forces in Egypt call for the pursuit of policies of "armed peace" and even
"confrontational peace" toward Israel.
Taken together, the multitude of political,
strategic and tactical moves leave no doubt that the key leaders in the
Arab World and Iran have already determined to continue the escalatory
brinkmanship even as the likelihood of war is growing. Moreover, the overall
situation and dynamics in the Arab Middle East contribute to a self-reinforcing
escalation. Hence, the three key leaderships in Damascus, Baghdad and Tehran,
as well as Cairo and the Abdallah faction in Riyadh, are increasingly convinced
that war is essentially inevitable. Consequently, there is already a clear
shift in these leaders' deliberations and consultations. They are now preoccuppied
mainly with strategic and military decisions -- that is, determining the
optimal conditions for initiating the war, achieving surprise despite the
protracted escalatory crisis and Israel's edginess, etc.
However, there is no hard evidence, yet,
of a specific decision to start something on a fixed date. Presently, the
prevailing mood among the political, military and security elites in the
Arab World is that of an almost passive, though willing, acceptance of
fate's course. As the region continues to deteriorate towards an eruption
of violence, they are waiting for the inevitable spark to emerge and "compel"
them into taking action. Among the supreme leaders that really count, the
"straw" seems to be still missing. But for how long?
Yossef Bodansky
Vaughn S. Forrest
Source: U.S.
House of Representatives: Task Force on Terrorism, 1996
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